| 000 | 01994 a2200205 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250205083757.0 | ||
| 020 | _a9780198785675 | ||
| 050 |
_aK 212 _bLUN 2024 |
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| 100 | 1 |
_aThomas, Lundmark,, _eauthor. |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aNiversals of legal reasoning by judges : _bA Plea for candour in decision making / _cLundmark, Thomas. |
| 264 | 1 |
_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c2024. |
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| 300 | _apages cm | ||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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| 520 | _a"The lion's share of the pages of this volume extract illustrations from judicial judgments that utilize one or more of a matrix of four varieties of legal argument inspired by the rich academic tradition of Germany. These varieties are denominated here as the textual, historical, purposive, and system-contextual. Briefly, textual justifications are those that are fashioned around the terms of a rule. Historical justifications focus on the circumstances surrounding the making or judicial modification of a rule. Purposive justifications explicitly employ the policies that a rule is said to promote. System-contextual justifications are those arguments that employ the terms analogical, reasonable, right, legal, constitutional, legitimate, appropriate, proportionate, fair, just, equitable, merciful, or in accordance with Treu und Glauben, good faith, the rule of law, or some other expression of justice. It is contended that this matrix of four is the most descriptive and convenient matrix of categories of legal argument. This book also exhibits dozens of instances in which judges erect a faȧde of disinterest and impartiality by stating or implying that a rule dictates a particular result when, in fact, the choice of argument or method is goal-oriented: the arguments merely serve to rationalize and justify decisions that the judges have reached"-- | ||
| 650 | _aLegal Reasoning | ||
| 942 |
_2lcc _cBK _h212 _iLUN _kK |
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| 999 |
_c11440 _d11440 |
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