01864    a2200253   4500020003000000020002700030020002500057050002200082100004000104245007900144300003700223336002600260337002900286338002700315504006600342505037500408520060800783650003001391650003001421650002901451650004301480650005501523700003201578  a9780691152752 (hardcover)  a0691152756 (hardcover)  a9780691152769 (pbk.)00aHF1385b.DAV 20121 aDavis, Christina L.,d1971-eauthor10aWhy adjudicate? :benforcing trade rules in the WTO /cChristina L. Davis.  axvi, 326 pages:billustrations ;  2rdacontentatextbtxt  2rdamediaaunmediated bn  2rdacarrieravolumebnc  aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [301]-318) and index.0 aIntroduction -- Domestic constraints and active enforcement -- The democratic propensity for adjudication -- The litigious state : U.S. trade policy -- The reluctant litigant: Japanese trade policy -- Conflict management : evaluating the effectiveness of adjudication -- Level playing field? : adjudication by developing countries -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.  aThe World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO 0aForeign trade regulation. 0aAdministrative procedure. 0aWorld Trade Organization 0aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS Exports & Imports 0aPOLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations Treaties  aChristina L. Davis.eauthor