Why adjudicate? : enforcing trade rules in the WTO /
Christina L. Davis.
- xvi, 326 pages: illustrations ;
Includes bibliographical references (p. [301]-318) and index.
Introduction -- Domestic constraints and active enforcement -- The democratic propensity for adjudication -- The litigious state : U.S. trade policy -- The reluctant litigant: Japanese trade policy -- Conflict management : evaluating the effectiveness of adjudication -- Level playing field? : adjudication by developing countries -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO
Foreign trade regulation. Administrative procedure. World Trade Organization BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Exports & Imports POLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations Treaties